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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  The continuing expansion and virtually limitless array of technology 
and media available to store electronic information has had an 
immeasurable impact on the amount of information large organizations 
create and maintain.  In many instances, this information continues to be 
available long after it has served the originator’s purposes.  Yet, such 
information is not exempt from discovery in litigation, and attempting to 
identify, preserve, collect, review, and produce that information results in 
a significant burden on litigants, while the failure to do so can result in 
draconian sanctions or adverse publicity. 
 
[2]  The existence of all of this information often requires large 
organizations to spend millions of dollars attempting to comply with 
modern discovery obligations, and ironically, these burdens may be 
triggered if an adversary can meet the very low evidentiary threshold that 
                                                            
∗ Jason Fliegel is a litigation associate at Mayer Brown whose practice includes electronic 
discovery.  He has written and spoken frequently on electronic discovery topics.  Mr. 
Fliegel served as an editor of The Sedona Principles and is a contributor to the Electronic 
Discovery Deskbook. 
∗∗ Robert Entwisle is a litigation associate at Mayer Brown whose practice includes 
electronic discovery.  He has previously worked at Discovery Services, LLC, an 
electronic discovery consulting firm, and for a Fortune 500 company, where he was 
regularly involved in managing electronic discovery issues. 
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notice pleading requires.1  Debate as we may the logic of imposing such 
significant burdens based on such a minimal showing, discovery, and 
particularly electronic discovery, is here to stay.2  While the burdens 
imposed are significant, modern discovery rules (especially the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as amended in 2006) take into account these 
burdens and can be used to shield litigants from sanctions or undue 
burdens.  To prevent sanctions and avoid other undue burdens, litigants 
must show their electronic discovery efforts were reasonable.3  To make 
such a showing, large organizations must be prepared to proactively 
manage electronic discovery issues through internal organization, 
communication, and the implementation of processes and procedures 
designed to preserve and produce relevant information. 
 
[3]  This article will survey the impact of electronic discovery on large 
organizations.  It will first describe electronic discovery and the 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the impact of the 
amendments on the way large organizations operate.  The article will then 
review some of the potential solutions to common electronic discovery 
problems. 
                                                            
1 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 535 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); The Big Data Dump, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2008, at 65, available at 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12010377. 
2 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 
506, 512 (2002)); Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 2002).   
 
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that our “simplified notice 
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary 
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of 
unmeritorious claims.”  Thus, it is now beyond dispute that ‘[b]road 
discovery is a cornerstone of the litigation process contemplated by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’  The Rules contemplate a minimal 
burden to bringing a claim; that claim is then fleshed out through 
vigorous and expansive discovery. 
  
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512).  
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
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II.  ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
 
[4]  “Electronic discovery” or “e-discovery” is a term of art that describes 
one particular aspect of the broader litigation discovery process.  
Discovery is the “[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of 
information that relates to the litigation.”4  Electronic discovery deals with 
the subset of that compulsory disclosure that requires the identification, 
preservation, collection, review, and production of electronic records and 
information “stored in any medium from which information can be 
obtained.”5  Indeed, a wide array of records stored on a variety of media 
are subject to discovery, including not only traditional electronic sources, 
such as computers, but also data stored on items like iPhones and 
BlackBerrys, memory sticks, flash drives, data discs, and even Internet-
based voicemail.6  Access to all of this information may be helpful to the 
truth-seeking function of the courts, but several problematic side effects 
result:  enhanced discovery compliance costs, enhanced discovery 
burdens, and the need for lawyers and judges to apply the law to highly 
technical topics generally beyond the knowledge of laymen. 
 
[5]  Because a substantial amount of electronic data is typically stored in 
diverse ways, and the information systems that house them are technical 
and idiosyncratic, mistakes can happen all too easily, and will often have 
far-reaching and unintended effects.  These mistakes can occur at any 
stage of the electronic discovery process.  At the preservation stage, if a 
litigation hold is not issued in a timely manner, or if counsel and the 
organization are unfamiliar with how records should be stored, relevant 
information could be discarded.7  The litigation hold also could be drafted 
too narrowly because certain “key players” were not identified, resulting 
in the loss of relevant information.8  Even when the hold is properly 
issued, without periodic reminders about the hold’s existence or revisions 
                                                            
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (8th ed. 2004). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
6  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (a) (2006 Amendment).  
7 See Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, *51 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 23, 2000) (granting motion for sanctions for defendant’s failure to take reasonable 
steps to preserve data); see also United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 
21, 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (imposing a monetary sanction of $250,000 on eleven corporate 
officers that failed to comply with a document retention policy). 
8 See generally Danis, 2000 WL 1694325 at *12-14. 
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to the hold as the case takes shape, there is an increased risk that relevant 
information will not be preserved.9  Data may be lost or corrupted if 
appropriate harvesting methods are not followed during the collection 
stage.10  During the processing and review stages, lack of planning can 
result in additional errors,11 including the inadvertent production of 
privileged materials.  
 
[6]  Until recently, courts had little rule-based guidance addressing the 
problems peculiar to electronic discovery.  Initially, a number of private 
organizations formed to provide guidance to the bench and bar.12  Then, 
after lengthy debate, the Supreme Court approved the 2006 amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were designed to address 
these problems.13  A number of states have followed suit and adopted e-
discovery rules, with some following the lead established by the federal 
rule amendments, some adopting only portions of the amendments, and 
others choosing to take an entirely individualized approach.14 
 
A.  THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
[7]  The 2006 electronic discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are intended to assist courts and litigants in balancing the 
need for electronically stored information with the burdens that 
accompany obtaining it.15  Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 of the Federal 
                                                            
9 See generally id. at *17. 
10 See generally id. 
11 See Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 212 F.R.D. 178, 181, 221-22, 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding person responsible for document collection was inadequately 
instructed). 
12 See generally The Sedona Conference, http://www.sedonaconference.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009); American Bar Association Section of Litigation, 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/issuecenter/issue_ediscovery.html (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee=248 (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2009).  
13 See infra Part II.A. 
14 See generally Thomas Y. Allman & Ashish S. Prasad, The Forgotten Cousin: State 
Rulemaking and Electronic Discovery, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION 
GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007, Oct.-Dec. 2007, at 317.  This article will 
focus on e-discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15 See id. at 325-27.   
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Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in a manner designed to provide 
access to relevant information, while reducing the burdens imposed on 
producing parties.  For example, through the use of the undefined term 
“electronically stored information” (ESI), the amendments create an initial 
limitation on a party’s obligation to produce relevant information and 
data.16  At the initial disclosure stage, a party must provide a “copy of, or a 
description by category and location of, all . . . electronically stored 
information . . . in [its] possession, custody, or control” that the disclosing 
party may use to support its claims or defenses.17  A party, however, need 
only initially produce ESI from “reasonably accessible” sources.18  If ESI 
is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” then the 
party need not produce it, though the party is still obligated to identify it.19  
The non-producing party may move to compel production of information 
from sources designated as “not reasonably accessible,” and if it does so, 
“the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information 
is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.  If that 
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such 
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”20  To balance the burdens imposed on a 
                                                            
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (a) (2006 Amendment) 
(“The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of 
technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically 
stored information.”). 
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (b)(2) (2006 Amendment) 
(Identification contemplates that the disclosing party will “provide enough detail to 
enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery 
and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.”). 
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).  This Rule states that: 
 
 The frequency or extent of the use of the discovery methods 
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be 
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some 
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 
by discovery in the action to obtain the information; or (iii) the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 3 
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producing party with the adversary’s desire to obtain relevant ESI, the 
court can impose conditions on production from a “not reasonably 
accessible” source, including shifting the cost burden from the producing 
party to the party seeking to obtain the discovery.21 
 
[8]  The amendments also require that the parties proactively address 
discovery in a collaborative fashion, which is intended to minimize court 
involvement and make discovery as self-executing as possible.  Under 
Rule 26(f), parties are required to meet and develop a plan to address 
electronic discovery issues prior to the Rule 16(b) scheduling 
conference.22 
 
[9]  One of the more controversial aspects of the amendments is the so-
called Rule 37(f) “safe harbor.”23  Rule 37 authorizes federal courts to 
sanction parties for discovery abuses.24  By recognizing the “distinctive 
feature of computer operations, [and] the routine alteration and deletion of 
information that attends ordinary use, Rule 37(f) creates an exception to 
this authority.” 25  The advisory committee’s notes explain that there are 
several “steps essential to computer operation [that] may alter or destroy 
information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information 
might relate to litigation.”26  As a result, the usual operation of computer 
systems may cause a party to lose potentially discoverable information, 
                                                                                                                                                   
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 
 
Id.  
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, subdivision (b)(2) (2006 
Amendment) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34 also contemplate that 
electronically stored information may be relied upon to answer interrogatories, or to 
comply with the document inspection and production requirements.  Rule 34 requests 
may specify the desired form of ESI production, though such demands are subject to 
undue burden and cost limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and Rule 34 contemplates 
objections as to the form of production, though the objecting party must specify an 
agreeable production format and otherwise produce the documents in a manner that is 
reasonably useable.). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)-(d). 
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (f) (2006 Amendment). 
26 Id. 
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even if such a loss is not the result of the party’s intentional conduct.27  
Consequently, Rule 37(f) provides: “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a 
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to 
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, 
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”28  This 
limitation, however, only applies to so-called “rules-based” sanctions.29  
Therefore, the court still retains authority to sanction a party for routine 
loss of data pursuant to its inherent authority to control litigation. 
 
B.  REALITY MEETS THE NEW RULES: THE NATURE OF DATA AT LARGE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
[10]  Large organizations are dynamic in nature and increasingly operate 
through the use of electronic data and information, which, as Rule 34 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear, may be subject to 
disclosure and discovery in litigation.30  Terabytes and terabytes of data 
                                                            
27 Id.   
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (emphasis added).  “The good faith requirement of Rule 37(f) 
means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information 
system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to 
destroy specific stored information that it is required to preserve.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 
advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (f) (2006 Amendment). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
30 Cf. Ed Sperling, Coping with Data Overload, FORBES, Dec. 29, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2008/12/28/cio-emc-lewis-tech-cio-
cx_es_1229emc.html.  Sperling writes: 
 
 Every CIO on the planet is besieged by data.  They come in 
through the electronic door by way of e-mail, they’re generated by 
employees creating business plans and purchase orders, and they 
multiply almost exponentially.   
 The fact that much of these data are paperless should, at least 
in theory, make data management much simpler.  The reality, however, 
is that it’s almost impossible to conceive how much data are produced 
by a company in a single day, let alone decades.  
 And sometimes these data come through in multiple 
languages.  In large corporations where employees are spread around 
the globe and furiously pounding out messages on BlackBerrys, new 
data are being generated every second of every day.  All of this 
information has to be stored somewhere, but the sheer volume coupled 
with the complexity of interactions in a company make this a daunting 
task even to the best-trained IT professionals. 
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and information are generated, serving a purpose, and then forgotten but 
never really lost.31  This data and information may exist not only on 
employee hard drives, but also in e-rooms and on shared work drives, 
flash drives, PDAs, databases, and legacy systems no longer in use.32  
Business employees or IT personnel may be the custodians of this data, 
yet they may have no substantive knowledge of the data contents.  The 
difficulty in complying with the 2006 amendments (or their state 
counterparts) by identifying, preserving, collecting, and producing all 
relevant sources of ESI creates a challenge that is daunting at best and, 
without careful planning, ripe for disaster. 
 
[11]  The rules do not require perfection, but organizations (and their 
lawyers) must be in a position to demonstrate that the efforts made to 
comply with discovery demands were reasonable.33  Making reasonable 
and good faith efforts to comply with discovery is a theme emphasized 
throughout recent rules and cases that analyze whether an organization has 
met its discovery obligations.  Though somewhat amorphous (out of 
necessity, given that courts must apply the standard to a multitude of 
different situations and scenarios), organizations can plan ahead by 
retaining counsel familiar with electronic discovery requirements.  
Electronic discovery counsel can help organizations design policies and 
procedures that assist employees to identify, separate, retain, and produce 
relevant information.  Organizations that take these steps are much less 
likely to receive sanctions or draconian discovery orders. 
 
C.  DUTIES OF COUNSEL 
 
[12]  Large organizations are not in this alone.  Rule 26(g)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney of record to sign all 
disclosures certifying that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
Id.  
31 See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. 
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
& COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE vi 
(2005), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf. 
32 See generally id. 
33 See id. at iv. 
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information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry . . . [the 
disclosure] is complete and correct as of the time it is made . . . .”34  In 
effect, Rule 26(g)(1) imposes on counsel a duty to guide, manage, and 
supervise her client’s efforts to comply with disclosure obligations.35  Rule 
26(g)(1) also requires that counsel certify that discovery objections and 
responses are consistent with the Rules, current law, or have a reasonable 
argument otherwise.36  With the reality of broad electronic discovery and 
the complexities and idiosyncrasies of modern record keeping and 
information systems, counsel must become knowledgeable about the ways 
her client maintains records and she must also manage the process from 
preservation to production so that she can certify compliance.  As we will 
see, lawyers and organizations alike can be sanctioned for perceived 
shortcomings or failures in the discovery process.37 
 
D.  QUALCOMM V. BROADCOM: A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR LARGE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNSEL 
 
[13]  Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.38 provides nine million reasons 
why large organizations should proactively confront the electronic 
discovery monster head-on.  For lawyers, Qualcomm teaches that failure 
to appropriately manage the discovery process can be hazardous to one’s 
license and reputation.  Qualcomm, Inc. (“Qualcomm”) filed suit against 
Broadcom Corp. (“Broadcom”), alleging Broadcom infringed on several 
patents.39  Broadcom claimed that Qualcomm participated with Broadcom 
and others in a “Joint Video Team” (“JVT”) that created the standard by 
which Qualcomm’s patented products were designed.40  Consequently, 
Broadcom claimed the patents were unenforceable.41   
                                                            
34 FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1). 
35 See FED R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (g) (1983 Amendment) 
(stating that “Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a 
responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and purposes of Rules 26 through 
37”). 
36 FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i). 
37 See e.g. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
38 No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). 
39 Id. at *1. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *1, *3. 
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[14]  To prove its claims, Broadcom sought discovery related to 
Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT.42  Qualcomm denied it was 
involved in the JVT during the time period at issue, but nonetheless agreed 
to produce responsive non-privileged documents “which [could] be 
located after a reasonable search.” 43 Qualcomm also stated that its 
investigation was ongoing and that it would supplement responses as 
“warranted by its investigation.”44  Yet, after designating two Rule 
30(b)(6) corporate witnesses to testify on its behalf (as individuals most 
knowledgeable about participation in the JVT)45 Qualcomm and its 
counsel failed to search either employee’s computer for relevant 
documents.46  During the second employee’s deposition, counsel for 
Qualcomm discovered that a Qualcomm employee was on one of the JVT 
e-mail distribution lists.47  But the attorney failed to question whether 
Qualcomm was involved in the JVT during the relevant time period.  
During trial, Qualcomm’s counsel discovered twenty-one emails on a 
Qualcomm witness’ computer that were associated with the development 
of the standard through the JVT during times wherein Qualcomm claimed 
it was not participating.48  After trial, in-house counsel for Qualcomm 
admitted that it failed to produce nearly 50,000 relevant documents, many 
of which undercut Qualcomm’s representations to the court.49  Magistrate 
Judge Barbara Major issued an order that Qualcomm show cause why the 
company and nineteen of its attorneys should not be sanctioned for alleged 
discovery abuses, including the failure to produce “tens of thousands” of 
relevant documents.50  The attorneys were those who “signed discovery 
responses, signed pleadings and pretrial motions, and/or appeared at trial 
on behalf of Qualcomm.”51 
                                                            
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Rule 30(b)(6) requires an organization named as a deponent to designate individuals to 
testify on its behalf, to the extent the organization has set forth which matters the 
individual is qualified to testify.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
46 Id. at *3.  The first witness testified Qualcomm never participated in the JVT, which 
was incorrect, so Qualcomm agreed to produce another 30(b)(6) witness.  The second 
witness testified that Qualcomm began work with the JVT in 2003.  Id. 
47 Id. n.2. 
48 Id. at *4. 
49 Id. at *6. 
50 Id. at *1. 
51 Id. 
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[15]  The court found that, “Qualcomm, its employees, and its witnesses 
actively organized and/or participated in a plan to profit heavily by (1) 
wrongfully concealing the patents-in-suit while participating in the JVT 
and then (2) actively hiding this concealment from the Court, the jury, and 
opposing counsel during the present litigation.”52  Judge Major found that 
Qualcomm’s “counsel participated in an organized program of litigation 
misconduct and concealment throughout discovery, trial, and post-trial 
before new counsel took over lead role in the case . . . .”53  The court 
explained: 
 
For the current “good faith” discovery system to function in 
the electronic age, attorneys and clients must work together 
to ensure that both understand how and where electronic 
documents, records and emails are maintained and to 
determine how best to locate, review, and produce 
responsive documents.  Attorneys must take responsibility 
for ensuring that their clients conduct a comprehensive and 
appropriate document search.  Producing 1.2 million pages 
of marginally relevant documents while hiding 46,000 
critically important ones does not constitute good faith and 
does not satisfy either the client’s or attorney’s discovery 
obligations.  Similarly, agreeing to produce certain 
categories of documents and then not producing all of the 
documents that fit within such a category is unacceptable.54 
 
[16]  The court noted that it had authority to sanction Qualcomm’s 
attorneys on the basis of Rule 26(g) and its requirement that an attorney 
certify that the objections and responses were made following a reasonable 
inquiry, analogizing this requirement with those found in Rule 11.55  The 
court then explained that by agreeing to produce all responsive documents 
based on a diligent search, Qualcomm gave Broadcom no reason to 
believe it was not participating in discovery in good faith.56  
Consequently, Broadcom did not file a motion to compel under Rule 37, a 
                                                            
52 Id. at *5. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *9. 
55 Id. at *7. 
56 Id. at *8. 
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prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions under the Rule.57  The court 
instead relied on its inherent authority to sanction, explaining: 
 
[R]eview of Qualcomm’s declarations, the attorneys’ 
declarations, and Judge Brewster’s orders leads this Court 
to the inevitable conclusion that Qualcomm intentionally 
withheld tens of thousands of decisive documents from its 
opponent in an effort to win this case and gain a strategic 
business advantage over Broadcom.  Qualcomm could not 
have achieved this goal without some type of assistance or 
deliberate ignorance from its retained attorneys.58 
 
The court found that Qualcomm failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
establish that it actually searched for responsive documents during the 
time period at issue or that it conducted any searches of the computers or 
databases of employees likely to have responsive documents, including 
those it identified to serve as its corporate witnesses.59  The court said such 
searches were “basic,” and the failure to conduct them was indicative of 
Qualcomm’s bad faith, along with the sheer volume of unproduced 
documents that directly undercut Qualcomm’s representations.60  In 
summary, the court concluded: 
 
Qualcomm had the ability to identify its employees and 
consultants who were involved in the JVT, to access and 
review their computers, databases and emails, to talk with 
the involved employees and to refresh their recollections if 
necessary, to ensure that those testifying about the 
corporation’s knowledge were sufficiently prepared and 
testified accurately, and to produce in good faith all 
relevant and requested discovery. . . . Qualcomm chose not 
to do so and therefore must be sanctioned.61 
                                                            
57 Id. 
58 Id. at *9. 
59 Id. at *10. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at *12. 
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[17]  Of the nineteen Qualcomm attorneys ordered to show cause, 
the court sanctioned six, referring generally to their failure to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry into Qualcomm’s discovery efforts.62  
As support for its findings, the court explained: 
 
It is inconceivable that these talented, well-educated, and 
experienced lawyers failed to discover through their 
interactions with Qualcomm any facts or issues that caused 
(or should have caused) them to question the sufficiency of 
Qualcomm’s document search and production.  Qualcomm 
did not fail to produce a document or two; it withheld over 
46,000 critical documents that extinguished Qualcomm’s 
primary argument of non-participation in the JVT.  In 
addition, the suppressed documents did not belong to one 
employee, or a couple of employees who had since left the 
company; they belonged to (or were shared with) 
numerous, current Qualcomm employees, several of whom 
testified (falsely) at trial and in depositions.  Given the 
volume and importance of the withheld documents, the 
number of involved Qualcomm employees, and the 
numerous warning flags, the Court finds it unbelievable 
that the retained attorneys did not know or suspect that 
Qualcomm had not conducted an adequate search for 
documents.63 
 
The court went on to say: 
 
[O]ne or more of the retained lawyers chose not to look in 
the correct locations for the correct documents, to accept 
the unsubstantiated assurances of an important client that 
its search was sufficient, to ignore the warning signs that 
the document search and production were inadequate, not 
to press Qualcomm employees for the truth, and/or to 
encourage employees to provide the information (or lack of 
                                                            
62 Id. at *13-15.  The court declined to sanction a number of attorneys, including several 
who signed pleadings acting as local counsel, by finding that, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, this would be inappropriate.  Id. at *16. 
63 Id. at *12. 
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information) that Qualcomm needed to assert its non-
participation argument and to succeed in this lawsuit.  
These choices enabled Qualcomm to withhold hundreds of 
thousands of pages of relevant discovery and to assert 
numerous false and misleading arguments to the court and 
jury.  This conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions.64 
 
The court explained that Rules 26(g) and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure should not be read so narrowly that only the attorney who 
signed false discovery responses could be sanctioned.65  To find otherwise 
would allow an attorney to rely on “inadequate or misleading” discovery 
responses to present “false and unsupported legal arguments.”66  The court 
again found sanctions appropriate under its inherent powers.67 
 
[18]  The court sanctioned Qualcomm in the amount of $8,568,633.24—
the total sum of Broadcom’s litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.68  This 
was justified because “Qualcomm’s failure to produce the massive number 
of critical documents at issue in this case significantly increased the scope, 
complexity and length of the litigation and justifies a significant monetary 
award.”69  The sanctioned attorneys were required to send a copy of the 
court’s order to the California State Bar Intake Unit so that their conduct 
could be evaluated and, if necessary, sanctioned by the State Bar.70  In 
addition, the court required Qualcomm and all sanctioned attorneys to 
participate in a “Case Review and Enforcement of Discovery Obligations” 
program (CREDO).71  The CREDO required that the sanctioned attorneys 
and Qualcomm:  
                                                            
64 Id. at *13. 
65 Id. at n.9. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *17. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at *18.  While the court’s order was upheld in these respects, it was vacated in part 
because the court found that the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege 
applied and as a matter of due process, Qualcomm’s lawyers were entitled to rely on 
otherwise privileged communications and materials to defend their conduct.  See 
Qualcomm v. Broadcom, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. March 5, 2008). 
71 Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *18. 
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(1) identify the factors that contributed to the discovery violation: 
insufficient communication (including between client and retained 
counsel, among retained lawyers and law firms, and between junior 
lawyers conducting discovery and senior lawyers asserting legal 
arguments), inadequate case management (within Qualcomm, between 
Qualcomm and the retained lawyers, and by the retained lawyers), 
inadequate discovery plans (within Qualcomm and between 
Qualcomm and its retained attorneys), etc.; 
 
(2) create and evaluate proposals, procedures, and processes that will 
correct the deficiencies identified in subsection (1);  
 
(3) develop and finalize a comprehensive protocol that will prevent 
future discovery violations; 
 
(4) apply the protocol developed under subsection (3) to other factual 
situations (such as when a client does not have corporate counsel, 
when the client has a single in-house lawyer, when the client has a 
large legal staff, and when there are two law firms representing one 
client); 
 
(5) identify and evaluate methods that corporations can implement to 
better enable counsel to identify potential sources of discoverable 
documents (e.g. the correct databases, archives, etc.), and  
 
(6) identify any other information or suggestions that will help prevent 
discovery violations.72 
 
Qualcomm is an important reminder that courts may have zero tolerance 
for discovery mismanagement and that the stakes cannot be higher for 
lawyers or their clients.73  The remainder of this article will discuss the 
problems that can occur during various stages of the electronic discovery 
production process, stressing forward thinking and proactive planning as a 
solution, with the assistance of counsel knowledgeable about electronic 
discovery. 
                                                            
72 Id. at *19.   
73 See id. 
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III.  PRESERVATION AND COLLECTION 
 
A.  IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT CUSTODIANS, DATA, AND INFORMATION 
 
[19]  Identifying the right custodians and data can be a difficult task, but it 
is the first step of any effort to appropriately tackle electronic discovery.  
Large organizations are structured for conducting business, but this does 
not necessarily mean that they are structured in a manner that makes 
complying with e-discovery obligations easy or even feasible without 
substantial planning and oversight by counsel.  The primary factor that 
contributes to difficulties in electronic discovery is the requirement that 
documents be preserved, extracted, and categorized in a manner that is 
“unnatural” to the organization.  Although difficult, demonstrating a 
reasonable good faith effort to preserve and collect the right data is 
essential to avoid sanctions.74 
 
[20]  For example, in Coleman (Parent) Holdings v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co.,75 Coleman (CPH) filed a lawsuit against Morgan Stanley, alleging 
fraud in connection with a stock sale.76  An SEC regulation required that 
Morgan Stanley maintain certain documents, including e-mail, for two 
years, although Morgan Stanley overwrote its e-mails after one year.77  
During discovery, the court ordered Morgan Stanley to (1) search its 
backup tapes for relevant e-mail; (2) identify e-mails containing certain 
words and key phrases; (3) produce all responsive non-privileged e-mails; 
(4) provide a privilege log; and (5) certify compliance with the order by 
May 14, 2004.78  Although some e-mails were produced as required, the 
certification was not executed until more than a month after it was due.79  
Once executed, it was also incorrect in its assertion that the production 
was complete, and the court found that the declarant, a Morgan Stanley 
employee responsible for managing records, knew this to be the case at the 
time he executed the declaration.80  In fact, potentially relevant e-mail 
                                                            
74 See id. at *9-12; see also supra text accompanying note 28. 
75 No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 1, 2005). 
76 Id. at *1. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at *2. 
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stored on nearly 2000 back-up tapes at two different storage locations still 
needed to go through a complicated restoration process prior to attorney 
review and production.81  This process was not completed until 
approximately January 2005, with trial scheduled for that February.82  
Also, during November 2004, an additional 8000 e-mails were produced, 
but according to the court, these were not associated with either of the two 
previously identified catalogs of back-up tapes.83   
 
[21]  During January and February 2005, additional back-up tapes were 
discovered at other facilities on three separate occasions.84  While the 
continued production from these sources was ongoing, Morgan Stanley 
discovered that an incorrect date range limiter had been used to search the 
sources of potentially relevant information identified and produced in May 
2004.  This resulted in Morgan Stanley unintentionally omitting 
potentially responsive e-mail in the portion of the production that was 
timely made.85 
 
[22]  In its opinion, the court documented all of these issues, which it 
perceived as shortcomings, and relied on them to make the following 
findings: 
 
[D]espite MS & Co.’s affirmative duty arising out of the 
litigation to produce its e-mails, and contrary to federal law 
requiring it to preserve the e-mails, MS & Co. failed to 
preserve many e-mails and failed to produce all e-mails 
required by the Agreed Order.  The failings include 
overwriting e-mails after 12 months; failing to conduct 
proper searches for tapes that may contain e-mails; 
providing a certificate of compliance known to be false 
when made and only recently withdrawn; failing to timely 
notify CPH when additional tapes were located; failing to 
use reasonable efforts to search the newly discovered tapes; 
failing to timely process and search data held in the staging 
                                                            
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *3. 
84 Id. at *4. 
85 Id. 
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area or notify CPH of the deficiency; failing to write 
software scripts consistent with the Agreed Order; and 
discovering the deficiencies only after CPH was given the 
opportunity to check MS & Co.’s work and the MS & Co.’s 
attorneys were required to certify the completeness of the 
prior searches.  Many of these failings were done 
knowingly, deliberately, and in bad faith.86 
 
The court said it was clear that Morgan Stanley had intended to “thwart” 
discovery, and as a sanction, shifted the burden of proof for CPH’s fraud 
claim to Morgan Stanley.87  The court further sanctioned Morgan Stanley 
by requiring that it pay for CPH’s costs in bringing the motion, agree to 
read a conclusive statement of facts detailing the discovery problems in 
the case, and allow CPH to argue any inferences that could be drawn from 
the facts, including that Morgan Stanley’s “concealment” could be relied 
upon to support a punitive damages claim.88 
 
[23]  Morgan Stanley provides an extreme example of the problems large 
organizations can face for failing to identify sources of potentially relevant 
data.  Problems identifying relevant data are avoidable, but require up-
front planning and substantial involvement and oversight by counsel.  
Organizations should strive to retain counsel familiar with electronic 
discovery requirements and allow counsel to become familiar with the 
organization and its operations.  Once litigation is reasonably anticipated 
(and throughout litigation), it is important for the client and discovery 
counsel to understand as much as possible about the facts of a case so that 
appropriate steps can be taken to preserve relevant documents.  Prior to 
litigation, counsel and the client should consider working together to map 
the organization’s information systems and technology infrastructure; 
doing so enables the organization to combine this information with the 
facts of the case to identify sources of potentially relevant data. 
                                                            
86 Id. at *5. 
87 Id. at *6. 
88 Id. at *7-8. 
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B.  PRESERVING AND COLLECTING DATA AND INFORMATION: THE 
ZUBULAKE CASES 
 
[24]  Identifying data is only the first step.  Once relevant data are 
identified, they must be preserved.  Accordingly, it is also essential that 
counsel and the client become familiar with the manner in which records 
are stored, and the retention period for those records, especially back-up 
tapes,89 so that counsel and the client can issue an appropriate order or 
“litigation hold” to prevent inadvertently discarding potentially relevant 
information.90  Failure to properly preserve data was at the core of one of 
the most notable e-discovery cases, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC 
(Zubulake I).91 
 
[25]  In Zubulake I, Laura Zubulake sued her former employer UBS for 
gender discrimination, and sought to prove her case by discovering e-mail 
and other information that existed in UBS’s active electronic files and 
archived back-up media.92  The question posed was “[t]o what extent is 
inaccessible electronic data discoverable, and who should pay for its 
production?”93  The court poignantly observed “[t]he more information 
there is to discover, the more expensive it is to discover all the relevant 
information until, in the end, ‘discovery is not just about uncovering the 
                                                            
89 Preservation of back-up tapes can often be costly and may not be necessary.  
90 See supra note 7.  
91 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
92 Id. at 312-13.  The Zubulake cases are famous in the e-discovery world; they are a 
series of five opinions written by Judge Shira Scheinlin prior to the amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Four of the Zubulake opinions – Zubulake I, III, IV, 
and V – highlight some of the problems organizations and counsel can face in identifying 
and preserving relevant information and offer sound guidance as to the appropriate 
manner for resolving the peculiar problems raised by e-discovery.  In particular, the cases 
explore and endeavor to answer the questions of when a court should shift the costs and 
burdens of e-discovery between litigants, under what circumstances and when electronic 
data must be preserved, how an organization should go about such preservation efforts, 
and the duties of organizations and counsel to participate in the discovery process.  See 
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 
III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 
220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 
229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
93 Id. at 311. 
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truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to 
disinter.’”94   
 
[26]  Zubulake wanted e-mail stored on UBS’s back-up tapes, which 
would be costly to restore.95  To resolve the parties’ dispute, the court 
began by describing its authority to shift the cost burden associated with 
discovery.96  Foreshadowing the eventual distinction made by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court explained that often discovery of 
electronic information will be unduly burdensome based on whether the 
data is stored “in an accessible or inaccessible format.”97  The court 
ordered UBS to produce, at its expense, all responsive e-mails existing in 
an accessible format (i.e., in a format that could be readily accessed with 
minimal burden).98  The court ordered further sampling from the back-up 
tapes that stored e-mail, and an affidavit providing the sampling results, 
along with the costs of restoration, so that it could then rule on whether 
cost-shifting was appropriate.99 
 
[27]  Zubulake III addressed the merits of UBS’s cost-shifting request.100  
The court engaged in a multi-factor analysis to determine that some cost-
shifting was appropriate, but determined that only the cost of restoration 
and searching are appropriately shifted to any degree.101  A producing 
party “should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing” 
responsive documents, even if retrieved from an inaccessible source, 
because the reviewing party has the sole power to design the review 
protocol and control costs.102 
 
[28]  After the restoration and search process was complete, the parties 
found themselves back in front of the court for Zubulake IV.  UBS had 
failed to preserve certain back-up tapes and e-mails had been deleted from 
                                                            
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 312-13. 
96 Id. at 315-16. 
97 Id. at 318 (emphasis omitted). 
98 See id. at 324. 
99 Id. 
100 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
Zubulake II did not address e-discovery issues. 
101 Id. at 289-90. 
102 Id. at 290 (emphasis in original). 
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UBS’s active systems after counsel issued a litigation hold directing 
employees to preserve all documents related to the Zubulake litigation.103  
Zubulake sought sanctions, requesting the reallocation of the restoration 
costs to UBS and reimbursement for the costs to re-depose certain 
witnesses, as well as an adverse inference instruction to the jury.104 
 
[29]  The court observed that the failure to preserve electronically stored 
information is a spoliation issue, and found authority to sanction litigants 
for the spoliation of evidence under its inherent authority and the Federal 
Rules.105  The key question was the scope of UBS’s duty to preserve the e-
mail, which required inquiry into when the duty arose and then, to the 
extent such a duty existed, the outer parameters of that duty.106  The court 
explained that the duty arises when “litigation [is] reasonably 
anticipated.”107  Although Zubulake filed an EEOC charge in August 
2001, the court found that UBS reasonably anticipated litigation before 
that time, explaining: 
 
Merely because one or two employees contemplate the 
possibility that a fellow employee might sue does not 
generally impose a firm-wide duty to preserve.  But in this 
case, it appears that almost everyone associated with 
Zubulake recognized the possibility that she might sue.  For 
example, an e-mail authored by Zubulake’s co-worker 
Vinnay Datta, concerning Zubulake and labeled “UBS 
attorney client priviladge [sic],” was distributed to Chapin 
(Zubulake’s supervisor), Holland and Leland Tomblick 
(Chapin's supervisor), Vail (Zubulake’s former supervisor), 
and Andrew Clarke (Zubulake’s co-worker) in late April 
2001.  That e-mail, replying to one from Hardisty, 
essentially called for Zubulake’s termination: “Our biggest 
strength as a firm and as a desk is our ability to share 
                                                            
103 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 216.  “Spoliation is ‘the destruction of or significant alteration of evidence, or 
the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably 
foreseeable litigation.’”  Id. (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 
776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 217. 
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information and relationships.  Any person who threatens 
this in any way should be firmly dealt with . . . .  [B]elieve 
me that a lot of other [similar] instances have occurred 
earlier.”108 
 
[30]  The court then addressed the breadth of UBS’s preservation 
obligations, explaining that it is completely unnecessary for a company to 
“preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and 
every backup tape,” recognizing that such a draconian requirement would 
“cripple large corporations . . . that are almost always involved in 
litigation.”109  The court explained that the “duty should certainly extend 
to any documents or tangible things . . . made by individuals ‘likely to 
have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support 
its claims or defenses,’” including documents prepared for those persons 
and information that is “‘relevant to the subject matter of the action.’”110  
As shorthand for describing the breadth of a litigant’s preservation duty, 
the court coined the phrase “key players” to describe those individuals 
who are likely to have, or know where to obtain, information relevant to 
the litigation.111   
 
[31]  Summarizing a litigant’s preservation obligations, the court said: 
 
The scope of a party’s preservation obligation can 
be described as follows: Once a party reasonably 
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a “litigation 
hold” to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.  As 
a general rule, that litigation hold does not apply to 
inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those typically maintained 
solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which may 
continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the 
company’s policy.  On the other hand, if backup tapes are 
accessible (i.e., actively used for information retrieval), 
                                                            
108 Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 217-18 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)). 
111 Id. at 218. 
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then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation 
hold. 
 However, it does make sense to create one 
exception to this general rule. If a company can identify 
where particular employee documents are stored on backup 
tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key players” 
to the existing or threatened litigation should be preserved 
if the information contained on those tapes is not otherwise 
available.  This exception applies to all backup tapes.112 
 
Applying these standards to the motion for sanctions, the court explained 
that UBS had a duty to preserve the back-up tapes at issue, but because 
Zubulake could not demonstrate that the information contained on the 
back-up tapes would have supported her claims, an adverse inference 
instruction was not warranted.113  The court required UBS to pay the costs 
for Zubulake to re-depose certain witnesses on the issues surrounding the 
destruction of relevant e-mails.114 
 
[32]  During these depositions, Zubulake discovered that additional 
potentially relevant e-mails were intentionally deleted, despite the 
existence of a litigation hold instructing that they be retained, and other e-
mail had not yet been collected from an employee; consequently, neither 
had been produced.115  Zubulake again requested that the court sanction 
UBS, and the court took up the issue in Zubulake V.116  Zubulake V 
explained a party’s duty to heed counsel’s advice to preserve potentially 
relevant documents and discussed in detail counsel’s key role as an active 
participant in, and supervisor of, a party’s discovery compliance efforts.117  
Acknowledging that litigants often issue a “litigation hold” to instruct 
custodians that certain information and data needed for litigation must not 
be discarded, the court explained that preservation duties go further: “[a] 
                                                            
112 Id.  The duty to preserve, however, does not require that a party retain “multiple 
identical copies” of documents, which means that a party need not preserve backup tapes 
if the data can be obtained from other, less burdensome sources. 
113 Id. at 219-22.   
114 Id. at 222.  The court noted that it had already considered the loss of certain e-mail in 
its original cost-shifting order, so further cost-shifting was not appropriate. 
115 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
116 Id. at 424. 
117 Id. at 431-36. 
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party’s discovery obligations do not end with the implementation of a 
‘litigation hold’—to the contrary, that’s only the beginning.  Counsel must 
oversee compliance with the litigation hold, monitoring the party’s efforts 
to retain and produce the relevant documents.”118  The court explained that 
“counsel and client must take some reasonable steps” to identify relevant 
sources of information and that counsel has an affirmative duty to locate 
relevant information, requiring that counsel “become fully familiar with 
her client’s document [and] data retention architecture” by communicating 
with key players and information technology personnel.119  After 
identifying and preserving sources of potentially relevant information, 
there is an ongoing duty to ensure continued compliance with the 
preservation directive.120  The court explains that this may involve 
periodically communicating directly with key players and assisting the 
client to put procedures in place to segregate and preserve relevant back-
up media.121   
 
[33]  The court found that UBS’s counsel failed to appropriately 
communicate the litigation hold, interview key players, and that UBS 
failed to heed counsel’s warnings and preserve relevant e-mails.122  In 
addition, the court found that the failure to preserve was willful and that an 
adverse inference instruction was appropriate.123  The court also required 
that UBS pay the costs associated with re-deposing witnesses in light of 
the tardy production of e-mails, along with the costs of the motion.124 
 
[34]  Zubulake IV and V create a roadmap for large organizations wrestling 
with electronic discovery obligations.  A large organization that is willing 
to work with counsel to proactively implement plans and procedures that 
help ensure the timely and continued preservation of ESI will have little 
difficulty showing that its efforts were reasonable.  In contrast, taking an 
ad hoc approach to electronic discovery not only increases the risk that 
                                                            
118 Id. at 432. 
119 Id. (emphasis in original). 
120 Id. at 433. 
121 Id. at 433-34. 
122 Id. at 436. 
123 Id. at 436-37. 
124 Id. at 437. 
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relevant data and information will be discarded, but virtually guarantees a 
finding that the organization’s efforts were not reasonable. 
 
[35]  If the information is never collected when needed, it will not matter 
that the information was preserved.  Zubulake V touched on the potential 
ramifications of such a situation; when a key player complies with the 
litigation hold, but counsel fails to collect her documents, the ultimate 
result is the late production of responsive e-mail(s).125  Tardy production 
can certainly cause problems, as it did for UBS, but it could have been 
worse.  Failing to collect the information could result in it never being 
discovered and produced, which opens the door for an adversary to argue 
that such information was intentionally “hidden.” 
 
[36]  Collection problems also go far beyond merely neglecting to ask for 
responsive information.  The technical nature of electronic media, and the 
special software that may be necessary to appropriately “harvest” the 
preserved data or information, can cause a myriad of problems that result 
in loss or corruption of the data as it actually exists in the organization’s 
files.126  At best, this might mean an invasive exploration of confidential 
and proprietary files by an adversary’s expert to confirm that the data 
produced was not altered.127  At worst, an organization may be faced with 
a finding that the evidence was spoliated by the process.128 
 
[37]  Given the risks, an organization’s plans to address discovery should 
include identifying and selecting appropriate ESI vendors.  An ESI vendor 
can provide various services, including data collection, processing, data 
hosting, and production.129  Some vendors provide all of these services, 
which can be desirable for a variety of reasons, including reduced pricing 
and better quality.130 
                                                            
125 See id. at 424. 
126 See Ashish Prasad et. al., Best Practices for Document Review in Litigation and 
Government Investigations 2008, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT 
CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW, Oct. 29, 2008, at 165, 167-68.  
127 See id. at 168-70. 
128 Cf. id. (discussing the consequences of errors in document review).  
129 Id. at 170-72. 
130 Id. at 172. 
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C.  THE VALUE OF PRIVILEGE WHEN FACING SANCTIONS 
 
[38]  No matter how prepared an organization is, it will inevitably face 
accusations that its electronic discovery efforts were below par.  To show 
such claims are baseless, it will often be necessary to rely on information 
that the organization deems privileged.  For example, when a law firm or 
general counsel’s office issues to company employees a “litigation hold” 
or other notice informing the constituents of ongoing litigation and the 
need to preserve relevant documents, courts have recognized such 
communications fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.131  
Appropriate preservation notices or “litigation holds” that suspend an 
organization’s usual records retention schedule are very helpful 
documents. Litigants should consider that revelation of the contents of the 
communication, in the right circumstances, may help demonstrate that the 
organization’s discovery compliance efforts were reasonable.  It may not 
even be necessary to reveal the contents of the communication beyond the 
court.  Litigants should first seek to submit such information to the court 
for in camera inspection.  This should preserve the privilege while 
providing the court with information it needs to find that the steps taken 
were reasonable.132 
 
IV.  DOCUMENT REVIEW 
 
A.  IDENTIFYING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND WITHHOLDING PRIVILEGED 
DOCUMENTS 
 
[39]  Counsel walks a razor’s edge in the document review realm, 
ensuring that a client’s production is broad enough to encompass all 
                                                            
131 See Muro v. Target Corp., 250 F.R.D. 350, 360 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also Ford Motor 
Co. v. Hall-Edwards, No. 3D08-2447, 2008 WL 5070290, at *6 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Dec. 3, 
2008) (“We conclude that the Ford suspension orders were created by Ford’s attorneys in 
anticipation of litigation and thus constitute work product.  Moreover, because revealing 
the documents identified by Ford’s counsel as those that need to be kept in anticipation of 
litigation would reveal the mental impressions of counsel, suspension orders fall within 
the absolute immunity protecting opinion work product. . . . Further, the suspension 
orders constituted legal advice given by Ford’s Office of the General Counsel to its client 
concerning the scope of documents which should be retained for purposes of pending or 
anticipated litigation.  Thus, they are protected under the attorney-client privilege.”) 
132 See, e.g., Muro, 250 F.R.D. at 360. 
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responsive documents (and “responsiveness” is often subjective), while 
narrow enough to not unnecessarily expose confidential or otherwise 
privileged client information to the opposing party or the public.  In 
addition, document review accounts for a substantial amount of litigation 
costs—some claim upwards of 90%.133  Often a client, understandably 
looking to reduce costs, will hire contract attorneys and other vendors to 
accomplish the review task. 
 
[40]  Experts in this field agree that, like so many other aspects of e-
discovery, investing in creating a careful plan and assembling the right 
team can make the process manageable and produce a defensible and more 
accurate review product.134  The importance of having a well-considered 
plan becomes all the more important when one considers that document 
reviews rely heavily on the most junior attorneys.  Breaking the process 
into stages that allow for proper information gathering, communication 
with opposing counsel, selecting appropriate review tools and vendors, 
appropriate review team training, and quality control all assist in the 
timely and accurate completion of the document review process.135 
 
B.  USE OF ADVANCED SEARCH AND REVIEW METHODS: DISCOVERY 
EXPERTS? 
 
[41]  Changes are on the horizon in the area of electronic discovery.  With 
increasingly more advanced methods of searching the gigabytes or 
terabytes of data needed for litigation becoming available, large 
organizations and counsel may find themselves looking for experts to 
validate their efforts.  Two opinions recently issued by Judge John M. 
Facciola illustrate the emphasis that courts are placing on the document 
search and review process.136  Taken together, the opinions envision that 
litigants will need to fulfill the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to challenge and defend their document search and 
                                                            
133 Dario Olivas & Michael Dolan, Legal Process Outsourcing of First Level Document 
Review, http://www.sourcingmag.com/content/c060918a.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).  
134 See generally Ashish S. Prasad et al., Cutting to the “Document Review” Chase, BUS. 
L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 57 (2008), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2008-11-
12/prasad.shtml. 
135 See id. at 57-60. 
136 Equity Analytics LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. 
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008).  
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review practices.137  These opinions underscore the necessity of having a 
proactive plan in place to handle discovery, and competent counsel to 
supervise and implement the plan, so that an expert can later opine that the 
search methods utilized would yield the intended results. 
 
1.  UNITED STATES V. O’KEEFE138 
 
[42]  In O’Keefe, the United States was ordered to search its files and 
produce documents associated with expedited visa applications.139  The 
government used keywords to identify potentially responsive documents 
and provided the court with an affidavit detailing the key words relied 
upon.140  Judge Facciola explained “[w]hether search terms or ‘keywords’ 
will yield the information sought is a complicated question involving the 
interplay, at least, of the sciences of computer technology, statistics and 
linguistics,” and that keyword searching, at least for the purpose of 
complying with discovery obligations, is “clearly beyond the ken of 
laymen [including lawyers and judges].” 141  The party challenging the 
sufficiency of such a search, however, has the burden of showing that it 
was insufficient, and Judge Facciola said such challenges must be 
                                                            
137 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: 
 
 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 702; see also O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14; Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. 
331 (applying Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to document search and 
review). 
138 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). 
139 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at *15.  Even though O’Keefe was a criminal matter, Judge 
Facciola relied extensively on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to interpret the 
government’s document review obligations.  O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at *18-23. 
140 Id. at *16-18. 
141 Id. at *24 (citing George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the 
Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2007)). 
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bolstered by evidence that complies with the requirements of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702.142 
2. EQUITY ANALYTICS V. LUNDIN143 
 
[43]  Equity Analytics, another Judge Facciola opinion, was issued less 
than a month after O’Keefe.144  The lawsuit was based on Equity 
Analytics’ allegations that Lundin, a former employee, illegally accessed 
its computer systems after he was terminated.145  The parties agreed that a 
search of Lundin’s personal computer (which he was using for personal 
matters and his new work) would need to be conducted, but they disagreed 
as to how that search should be accomplished.146  Predictably, Equity 
Analytics (Equity) wanted an expansive forensic search of Lundin’s 
personal computer, citing a change in operating systems as potentially 
corrupting files and preventing the discovery of relevant information, 
while Lundin preferred a search restricted to certain keywords and files, 
citing the substantial amount of irrelevant and confidential personal 
information contained on his computer.147 
 
[44]  Judge Facciola said: 
 
[L]awyers express as facts what are actually highly 
debatable propositions as to the efficacy of various methods 
used to search electronically stored information. . . .  
 [D]etermining whether a particular search 
methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be 
effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a 
lay person (and a lay lawyer) and requires expert testimony 
that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Obviously, determining the 
significance of the loading of a new operating system upon 
file structure and retention and why the contemplated 
forensic search will yield information that will not be 
                                                            
142 Id. at *24. 
143 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008). 
144 Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. 331; O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14.  
145 Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. at 332. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 332-33. 
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yielded by a search limited by file types or keywords are 
beyond any experience or knowledge I can claim. 
 Accordingly, I am going to require Equity to submit 
an affidavit from its examiner explaining why the 
limitations proposed by plaintiff are unlikely to capture all 
the information Equity seeks and the impact, if any, of the 
loading of the new operating system upon Lundin’s 
computer and the data that was on it before the new 
operating system was loaded.  The expert shall also 
describe in detail how the search will be conducted.  Armed 
with that information, supplemented if necessary by a 
hearing at which the expert will be cross examined, I can 
make the best possible judgment as to how to balance 
Equity’s need for information against Lundin’s privacy.148 
 
[45]  The expert was to make a “mirror image” of the hard drive, which 
would presumably preserve Lundin’s computer in its current state, but 
Equity, concerned that the mirror image would not be exact, wanted the 
computer that Lundin needed to make a living preserved until the 
conclusion of the litigation, effectively depriving Lundin of its use.  Judge 
Facciola again deferred to the expert to determine whether the mirror 
images would be “perfect copies” of Lundin’s hard drives.149 
 
[46]  Given the prevalence of Google, Yahoo,  and other search engines, 
we take it for granted that we can rely on keyword searching as a tool 
without needing to resort to an expert to make sure we identified the 
information desired.  Lawyers have been using keywords to search 
Westlaw and Lexis for years.  Yet Judge Facciola’s point in O’Keefe is 
well taken.  We know from personal experience that not all searches are 
equally effective.  While we can become journeymen, or even search 
experts, if we often use the same search tool to look for the same types of 
information, the skills required are a combination of understanding the 
technology we are using and the linguistics necessary to identify the 
desired information.  Considering this, before large organizations and 
lawyers represent to courts that they have conducted a reasonable search, 
they should consider whether they should identify someone who can be 
                                                            
148 Id. at 333.  
149 Id. at 333-34. 
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qualified as an expert under Rule 702 to conduct or supervise the search.  
If challenged, the “search expert” will be in a position to opine that the 
search was reasonable and identified the desired relevant documents.150 
 
[47]  Keyword searching is literally the tip of the iceberg when it comes to 
separating the relevant from non-relevant in document review.  Advanced 
forms of technology are being explored that are intended to reduce costs 
while enhancing accuracy.151  While in its infancy, such methods show 
great promise.  Large organizations that rely on such methods, however, 
will need to be prepared to show, likely through an expert, that the search 
method was successful in identifying relevant information. 
 
V.  PRODUCTION 
 
A.  FORM OF PRODUCTION 
 
[48]  With the variety of media types in existence, the available methods 
of production have also grown.  It is no longer necessary to produce 
multiple bankers boxes filled with hard copy documents; the same volume 
can often be captured on a single DVD or computer hard drive.  But with 
the variety of production options comes a new problem: often the selected 
method of production will not be acceptable to the opposing party, perhaps 
because the party does not have the required software to view the 
documents or, as is becoming increasingly common, it prefers the “native” 
version of the document, as opposed to an imaged .pdf or .tiff copy.152 
                                                            
150 It will also be necessary to document the steps taken to conduct the search. 
151 For example, the company H5 claims that, through the use of advanced technology 
and experts, it can reduce document review costs and inaccuracy by fifty percent.  See H5 
Company Approach, http://www.h5.com/services/approach.html (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009).  
152 “Native format” is defined as follows: 
 
Electronic documents have an associated file structure defined by the 
original creating application.  This file structure is referred to as the 
“native format” of the document.  Because viewing or searching 
documents in the native format may require the original application (for 
example, viewing a Microsoft Word document may require the 
Microsoft Word application), documents may be converted to a neutral 
format as part of the record acquisition or archive process.  “Static” 
formats (often called “imaged formats”), such as TIFF or PDF, are 
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[49]  The court in Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Division153 underscored the solution to this problem, which is to address 
ESI production early: 
 
This lawsuit demonstrates why it is so important that 
parties fully discuss their ESI early in the evolution of a 
case.  Had that been done, the Defendants might not have 
opposed the Plaintiffs’ requests for certain metadata.  
Moreover, the parties might have been able to work out 
many, if not all, of their differences without court 
involvement or additional expense, thereby furthering the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this case.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  Instead, these proceedings have now 
been bogged down in expensive and time-consuming 
litigation of electronic discovery issues only tangentially 
related to the underlying merits of the Plaintiffs’ Bivens 
claims.  Hopefully, as counsel in future cases become more 
knowledgeable about ESI issues, the frequency of such 
skirmishes will diminish.154 
 
[50]  In Aguilar, the parties failed to address the document production 
format during the Rule 26(f) conference and when plaintiff’s discovery 
requests likewise failed to specify a desired production format.155  After 
                                                                                                                                                   
designed to retain an image of the document as it would look viewed in 
the original creating application but do not allow metadata to be viewed 
or the document information to be manipulated.  In the conversion to 
static format, the metadata can be processed, preserved and 
electronically associated with the static format file.  However, with 
technology advancements, tools and applications are becoming 
increasingly available to allow viewing and searching of documents in 
their native format, while still preserving all metadata. 
 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP OF ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., 
THE SEDONA GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 37 (2d 
ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf. 
153 Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., No. 07 Civ. 8224(JGK)(FM), 2008 WL 5062700 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008). 
154 Id. at *14. 
155 Id. at *2. 
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defendants had nearly completed processing the documents, plaintiff 
demanded that certain documents be produced in a “native” format, while 
others be produced with the corresponding metadata for each file.156  
Aguilar is but one example of why it is so important for large 
organizations and counsel to discuss the production format up-front, which 
will help avoid a waste of time and resources. 
 
B.  PRIVILEGE CONCERNS 
 
[51]  Because the amount of available relevant data has grown 
exponentially, it has become increasingly difficult to prevent the 
inadvertent production of privileged information.  Recently, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were amended to address this problem. 
 
1. RULE 502 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
[52]  On September 19, 2008, Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
was enacted.157  The Rule applies to all federal cases filed after its 
enactment and in any pending proceeding whenever “just and 
practicable.”158  It also operates to prevent arguments of waiver in state 
court proceedings, to the extent disclosure is made in a federal proceeding.  
In Rule 502(a), the Rule first addresses so-called “subject matter waiver,” 
which extends waiver of the attorney-client privilege beyond the actual 
document produced to anything dealing with the “subject matter” of the 
communication actually disclosed.159  In attempting to limit the damage to 
                                                            
156 Id. 
 
Metadata, frequently referred to as “data about data,” is electronically-
stored evidence that describes the “history, tracking, or management of 
an electronic document.”  It includes the “hidden text, formatting 
codes, formulae, and other information associated” with an electronic 
document. . . . Although metadata often is lumped into one generic 
category, there are at least several distinct types, including substantive 
(or application) metadata, system metadata, and embedded metadata. 
 
Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
157 FED. R. EVID. 502.  
158 Id. advisory committee’s note. 
159 See FED. R. EVID. 502(a).  See generally Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. 
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 757, 772 (2008). 
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the privilege that was often caused by such disclosures, Rule 502(a) 
provides that, if disclosure of a privileged communication occurs, the 
waiver extends to undisclosed communications only if three criteria are 
satisfied: 1) the waiver must be intentional; 2) the disclosed and 
undisclosed communications concern the same subject matter; and 3) in 
fairness, ought to be considered together.160  This will prevent expansive 
inadvertent disclosures, while simultaneously preventing attorneys from 
abusing the attorney-client privilege: disclosing only favorable 
communications and withholding unfavorable communications of the 
same subject matter.161 
 
[53]  Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the 
inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privileged communications.162  A 
litigant comes within the scope of the Rule when the disclosure is 
inadvertent, reasonable steps were taken to prevent disclosure, and upon 
discovery, reasonable steps were promptly taken to address the waiver.163  
                                                            
160 FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
161 Id. 
162 FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
163 Id.  The Rule expressly contemplates that this may involve taking the steps set-forth in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B): 
 
If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege 
or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim 
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the 
basis for it.  After being notified, a party must promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; 
must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; 
must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party 
disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the 
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim.  
The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is 
resolved. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).  Rule 502(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that: 
 
When the disclosure is made in a State proceeding and is not the 
subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does 
not operate as a waiver in a Federal proceeding if the disclosure:
 (1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made 
in a federal proceeding; or  (2) is not a waiver under the law of 
the state where the disclosure occurred. 
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One of its best features is the uniform effect of a federal court’s ruling that 
a waiver has not taken place.  In cases pending before a federal court, to 
the extent the court determines a waiver has not taken place, that order 
stands in any other federal or state proceeding.164 
 
[54]  At least two courts have had the opportunity to apply the inadvertent 
waiver provisions of Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and early 
indications stress that it is essential to conduct defensible methods of 
search and review so that a court will find that the litigant’s efforts were 
reasonable.165  This is the lynch-pin: if the court finds the review was 
careless or not conducted in a reasonable manner, the privilege will be 
lost.   
 
[55]  In Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp.,166 Relion Inc.’s (“Relion”) 
counsel reviewed documents in preparation for production to avoid 
providing privileged documents to Hydra Fuel Cell Corp. (“Hydra”).167  
Counsel did not identify two privileged e-mails contained within a 
production that occupied “over 40 feet of shelf space.”168  Four months 
later, Hydra notified Relion of the production, and Relion claimed it was 
inadvertent.169  The court was not persuaded, proclaiming, “Relion has not 
carried its burden of disproving waiver.”170  Because Relion had the 
opportunity to review the files prior to inspection by Hydra, and Hydra 
delivered a hard copy and text-searchable copy of those documents 
selected for copying, the court concluded that “Relion did not pursue all 
reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the documents 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
FED. R. EVID. 502(c). 
164 FED. R. EVID. 502(d).  Rule 502(e) contemplates that parties can agree that production 
of privileged information will not constitute a waiver, but such agreements are binding 
only on the parties.  The agreement would need to be incorporated into a court order to 
have effect beyond the parties.  FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
165 See Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828 (D. 
Or. Dec. 4, 2008); Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere and Co., No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL 
4997932 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2008). 
166 2008 WL 5122828 (2008).  
167 Id. at *3. 
168 Id. at *2-3. 
169 Id. at *3. 
170 Id. 
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produced to Hydra,” thereby waiving the privilege.171  It is questionable 
whether the standard imposed by the court, “all reasonable means,”172 is 
actually consistent with the plain language of Rule 502(b), which requires 
that only “reasonable steps” be taken to prevent disclosure.173  
Nonetheless, litigants can expect, and must be prepared to confront, 
differing opinions on what is reasonable; Relion shows that the threshold 
will be quite high in some courts. 
 
[56]  In Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere and Co.,174 the court came to the 
entirely opposite conclusion than the court in Relion.  Plaintiff produced 
two discs that contained privileged information and discovered the error 
nearly a month later when defendant attempted to use the documents 
during a deposition.175  Concluding that the production was inadvertent, 
the court explained plaintiff’s review efforts were reasonable, citing the 
limited privilege disclosure as compared with the volume of documents 
actually produced in the case and the fact that the production took place 
outside of the litigant’s “inspect and copy” procedure, which may have 
allowed plaintiff to identify the documents.176  Finding that plaintiff also 
promptly attempted to rectify the inadvertent production, the court 
explained: 
 
Plaintiffs’ counsel first discovered the inadvertent 
disclosure at the January 31, 2008, deposition of plaintiffs’ 
expert Thomas Schwartzenberger.  Counsel lodged an 
objection based on privilege at that deposition, sent a letter 
to defense counsel demanding return of the information on 
the same day, and lodged repeated objections and requests 
for return at subsequent depositions.  And, by February 21, 
three weeks after learning of the inadvertent disclosure, 
plaintiffs had secured from the Court an order compelling 
defendants to return the inadvertently disclosed disks.  In 
                                                            
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).  
174 2008 WL 4997932 (2008). 
175 Id. at *8-9. 
176 Id. at *9. 
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these circumstances, plaintiffs diligently attempted to 
rectify the inadvertent disclosure.177 
 
[57]  Even though Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is helpful in attempting 
to create uniformity in the area of privilege waiver and reward litigants for 
their reasonable efforts, the two cases above make clear that courts will 
closely scrutinize whether a litigant’s efforts were truly reasonable.  The 
more demonstrable a litigant’s efforts and routine procedures are, and the 
more sophisticated its counsel is in the area of e-discovery, the more likely 
a court will uphold privilege claims despite production. 
 
2.  VICTOR STANLEY V. CREATIVE PIPE178 
 
[58]  As Federal Rule of Evidence 502 makes clear, document search and 
review methods are inextricably tied to the question of whether 
inadvertently produced privileged documents will maintain their status as 
privileged.179  Although not decided under Rule 502, Victor Stanley v. 
Creative Pipe makes clear that, as technology advances and more 
sophisticated methods of document retrieval emerge, demonstrating 
“reasonable” efforts may require expert opinion, similar to that which was 
required in O’Keefe and Equity Analytics.180  Courts will continue to 
reward litigants who proactively address their discovery obligations with 
an eye toward defending the methods used. 
 
[59]  In Victor Stanley, the parties disputed the scope of defendants’ 
document production, which the court resolved by requiring the parties to 
confer and present a joint protocol for the search and retrieval of ESI (both 
parties’ experts were involved in designing the searches).181  The 
defendants claimed that a full privilege review of the population of 
relevant documents would be unduly burdensome and could not be timely 
completed, so defendants proposed a keyword search buttressed by a 
                                                            
177 Id. 
178 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008). 
179 FED. R. EVID. 502; Id. at 257. 
180 Cf. id (discussing the difficult process of determining whether inadvertent production 
of attorney client privileged materials or work-product protected materials constitutes a 
waiver); see supra Part IV.B.1-2.   
181 Id. at 253-54. 
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“clawback agreement” that would prevent inadvertent waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege by production of privileged documents.182  When 
the court extended the discovery deadline by four months, however, the 
defendants abandoned their request for a clawback agreement.183  
Defendants and their counsel created a keyword list of seventy keywords 
that were to be used to identify potentially privileged documents.184  The 
search was conducted and all documents that did not contain the keywords 
were produced.185  A large subset of files could not be text searched, but 
rather than manually review each document, and citing time constraints, 
counsel elected to look at the document titles only, exploring the 
document contents further if it appeared that they contained potentially 
privileged information.186  The result was the production of 165 
purportedly privileged documents, and defendant could not explain from 
which document population the documents were inadvertently 
produced.187 
 
[60]  Finding fault with the methods used to search for and identify 
potentially relevant documents, as well as a lack of information from 
which the court could determine whether the search was reasonable, the 
court explained: 
 
[T]he Defendants are regrettably vague in their description 
of the seventy keywords used for the text-searchable ESI 
privilege review, how they were developed, how the search 
was conducted, and what quality controls were employed to 
assess their reliability and accuracy.  While it is known that 
M. Pappas (a party) and Mohr and Schmid (attorneys) 
selected the keywords, nothing is known from the affidavits 
provided to the court regarding their qualifications for 
designing a search and information retrieval strategy that 
could be expected to produce an effective and reliable 
privilege review. . . . [A]ll keyword searches are not created 
                                                            
182 Id. at 254-55. 
183 Id. at 255. 
184 Id. at 255-56. 
185 Id. at 256. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. 
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equal; and there is a growing body of literature that 
highlights the risks associated with conducting an 
unreliable or inadequate keyword search or relying 
exclusively on such searches for privilege review.  
Additionally, the Defendants do not assert that any 
sampling was done of the text searchable ESI files that 
were determined not to contain privileged information on 
the basis of the keyword search to see if the search results 
were reliable.  Common sense suggests that even a properly 
designed and executed keyword search may prove to be 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive, resulting in the 
identification of documents as privileged which are not, 
and non-privileged which, in fact, are.  The only prudent 
way to test the reliability of the keyword search is to 
perform some appropriate sampling of the documents 
determined to be privileged and those determined not to be 
in order to arrive at a comfort level that the categories are 
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.  There is no 
evidence on the record that the Defendants did so in this 
case.  Rather, it appears from the information that they 
provided to the court that they simply turned over to the 
Plaintiff all the text-searchable ESI files that were 
identified by the keyword search Turner performed as non-
privileged, as well as the non-text searchable files, that 
[defense counsel’s] limited title page search determined not 
to be privileged.188 
 
Later, the court expanded on this and, relying on Equity Analytics and 
O’Keefe, explained: 
 
[T]he Defendants obtained the results of the agreed-upon 
ESI search protocol and ran a keyword search on the text-
searchable files using approximately seventy keywords 
selected by . . . [defendant and counsel].  Defendants, who 
bear the burden of proving that their conduct was 
reasonable for purposes of assessing whether they waived 
                                                            
188 Id. at 256-57. 
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attorney-client privilege by producing the 165 documents 
to the Plaintiff, have failed to provide the court with 
information regarding: the keywords used; the rationale for 
their selection; the qualifications of . . . [defendant and 
counsel] to design an effective and reliable search and 
information retrieval method; whether the search was a 
simple keyword search, or a more sophisticated one, such 
as one employing Boolean proximity operators; or whether 
they analyzed the results of the search to assess its 
reliability, appropriateness for the task, and the quality of 
its implementation.  While keyword searches have long 
been recognized as appropriate and helpful for ESI search 
and retrieval, there are well-known limitations and risks 
associated with them, and proper selection and 
implementation obviously involves technical, if not 
scientific knowledge.189 
 
[61]  The court stressed that because discovery disputes often require that 
the court make factual determinations, it was entirely appropriate for a 
court to rely on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to analyze 
whether the selected search method was likely to identify the desired 
subset of documents, and that as a finder of fact the court is entitled to 
actual facts to decide discovery disputes, rather than the mere 
representations that the search was “diligent” or “reasonable.”190  As it 
applied to defendant, the court explained: 
 
Selection of the appropriate search and information 
retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by 
persons qualified to design effective search methodology.  
The implementation of the methodology selected should be 
tested for quality assurance; and the party selecting the 
methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale for 
the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is 
appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly 
implemented.191 
                                                            
189 Id. at 259-60. 
190 Id. at 261. 
191 Id. at 262. 
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[62]  To decide whether defendant waived the attorney-client privilege, 
the court employed a balancing test that took into consideration: (1) the 
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; 
(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; 
(4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) 
overriding interests in justice.192  The court spent the bulk of its opinion 
explaining why defendant’s search and retrieval methods were 
unreasonable, pointing consistently to the lack of factual information, 
upon which it could find the search reasonable.  The court then quickly 
dispatched with the remaining factors to find defendant’s production 
constituted a privilege waiver. 
 
[63]  Victor Stanley underscores the need for large organizations to have 
practices and procedures in place that are routinely and consistently 
utilized to identify potentially relevant and privileged documents.  As 
Victor Stanley makes clear, though a lofty and admirable goal, perfection 
is not demanded under the Federal Rules.  What is required, and rewarded, 
are proactive plans to address discovery in a manner calculated to 
substantially comply with the Rules. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[64]  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and courts interpreting the 
Rules or their state counterparts, reward reasonable efforts to comply with 
the discovery process.  Large organizations should work with outside 
counsel to proactively address electronic discovery by designing and 
implementing plans, policies, and procedures targeted at capturing, 
preserving, and producing relevant information.  Without question, such 
efforts will not make the organization challenge-proof, but the risk of 
sanctions or costly court orders will be greatly reduced. 
                                                            
192 Id. at 259. 
